Regulations · 2026-04-01 · 12 min read

The Proposed HIPAA Security Rule Overhaul: What Would Change and What Applies Today

In January 2025 HHS proposed the largest overhaul of the HIPAA Security Rule in two decades. It is not final. Here is what the rule requires today, what the proposal would change if finalized, and why hospitals already ask vendors for many of the proposed controls.

HIPAA Security Rule proposal

On January 6, 2025, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a proposed rule to overhaul the HIPAA Security Rule: the notice of proposed rulemaking "HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information" (90 FR 898). It is the largest proposed change to the Security Rule since it took effect in 2005.

It is a proposal, not law. As of November 2026 HHS has not published a final rule, and final action is not expected before 2027. The Security Rule in force today is still 45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C, with its familiar mix of "required" and "addressable" implementation specifications. Anything you read that describes the proposal as already mandatory, or gives a firm 2026 compliance deadline, is wrong.

This guide covers three things: what the rule requires today, what the proposal would change if it is finalized as written, and why health-tech vendors are already being asked for many of the proposed controls anyway.

What applies today

The current Security Rule applies to covered entities (providers that bill electronically, health plans and clearinghouses) and, since the HITECH Act and the 2013 Omnibus Rule, directly to their business associates. If your SaaS product creates, receives, maintains or transmits ePHI for a hospital, clinic or payer, these obligations are already yours:

  • A risk analysis and risk management (45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)-(B)): an accurate and thorough assessment of the risks to the ePHI you hold, and measures that reduce those risks to a reasonable and appropriate level.
  • An assigned Security Official (164.308(a)(2)), workforce security, information access management, security awareness and training, security incident procedures, a contingency plan, and periodic evaluation.
  • Physical safeguards for facilities, workstations, and devices and media.
  • Technical safeguards (164.312): access control, audit controls, integrity, person or entity authentication, and transmission security.
  • Business associate agreements with your own subcontractors that handle PHI (164.308(b) and 164.314(a)).
  • Written policies and documentation, retained for six years (164.316).

"Addressable" has never meant optional. For an addressable specification such as encryption at rest (164.312(a)(2)(iv)), you must implement it if it is reasonable and appropriate, or document why not and implement an equivalent alternative measure. Regulators and hospital reviewers both read an undocumented decision to skip encryption as a gap.

Breach notification is governed by a separate rule and is not changed by the proposal. A business associate must notify the covered entity of a breach of unsecured PHI without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 days after discovery (45 CFR 164.410). Many hospital BAAs set a shorter contractual deadline.

What the proposal would change if finalized

The NPRM is long, but most of its changes fall into a few themes. Each item below is a proposed requirement, not a current one.

No more "addressable." The proposal would remove the distinction between required and addressable implementation specifications, making almost all of them required, with limited, specific exceptions.

Written everything. All Security Rule policies, procedures, plans and analyses would need to be in writing and reviewed on a set schedule.

Asset inventory and network map. Regulated entities would maintain a written inventory of technology assets and a network map showing how ePHI moves through their systems, reviewed at least every 12 months and when the environment changes.

More prescriptive risk analysis. The proposal spells out what a risk analysis must contain, including the asset inventory, reasonably anticipated threats, vulnerabilities, and a risk level for each threat and vulnerability, and would require annual review.

Named technical controls. Multi-factor authentication and encryption of ePHI at rest and in transit would be required, with limited exceptions. The proposal also covers network segmentation, anti-malware, removal of unnecessary software, and separate controls for backup and recovery.

Testing on a schedule. Vulnerability scans at least every six months and penetration tests at least every 12 months.

Recovery and response. Written procedures to restore critical relevant systems and data within 72 hours, and written, tested security incident response plans. This 72-hour figure is a restoration target. It is not a breach-reporting deadline.

Workforce access changes. Notice to other regulated entities within 24 hours when a workforce member's access to ePHI or certain systems is changed or terminated.

Compliance audits. An audit of compliance with the Security Rule at least once every 12 months.

Business associates. Business associates would have to verify to covered entities, at least once every 12 months, that they have deployed the required technical safeguards, through a written analysis by a qualified person and a certification by someone with authority to act for the business associate. Business associates would also notify covered entities within 24 hours of activating their contingency plans.

Timing, if finalized. As proposed, the rule would take effect 60 days after a final rule is published, with compliance generally required 180 days after that, and a transition period for existing BAAs. HHS may change any of this, or the content itself, in a final rule.

What the proposal does not do

Three claims about the proposal circulate widely and are wrong:

  • It does not change breach notification deadlines. The 60-day outer limit for individual notice (164.404) and for business associate notice to the covered entity (164.410) stays where it is. There is no "72-hour breach notification" rule under HIPAA.
  • It does not make violations automatically "willful neglect." Penalty tiers turn on what the organization knew and how it responded, and OCR decides them case by case. Failing to implement a required control can still be costly, but no rule converts it into a particular tier automatically.
  • It is not in force. Until a final rule is published, the proposed requirements are not enforceable as HIPAA requirements. They are a strong signal of regulatory direction.

Penalties today

HHS adjusts HIPAA civil money penalties for inflation each year. Under the adjustment effective January 28, 2026 (45 CFR 102.3, as amended at 91 FR 3666):

  • Did not know (and would not have known with reasonable diligence): $145 to $73,011 per violation
  • Reasonable cause, not willful neglect: $1,461 to $73,011 per violation
  • Willful neglect, corrected within 30 days: $14,602 to $73,011 per violation
  • Willful neglect, not corrected: $73,011 to $2,190,294 per violation

The calendar-year cap for identical violations is $2,190,294 in the regulation's table. HHS has also stated, in a 2019 notice of enforcement discretion, that it applies lower annual caps for the first three tiers. Penalties are only part of the cost of a resolution agreement: corrective action plans typically run for years.

Why health-tech vendors are hearing about these controls now

Even without a final rule, many hospitals, clinics and payers already ask vendors about the controls in the proposal: MFA on every system that touches PHI, encryption at rest and in transit, a current asset inventory, an annual penetration test, tested backups with a stated recovery time, and an incident response plan with a breach notification timeline. For a health-tech vendor, the practical deadline is the next security review, not the Federal Register.

That makes the proposal a useful checklist of what reviewers will ask, as long as you keep two lists separate: what HIPAA requires of you today, and what your customers expect.

A practical plan

  1. Start with the current risk analysis. If you do not have a documented, current Security Rule risk analysis, that is your most important gap under the rule in force today, and it is the first document hospital reviewers ask for.
  2. Close the controls reviewers ask about first. MFA and encryption are the usual starting points. Under the current rule, document your decisions for any addressable specification you have not fully implemented.
  3. Build the inventory. An asset inventory and data-flow map are useful today, because they make your risk analysis accurate, and they would be required under the proposal.
  4. Test. Schedule a penetration test and a restore test, and keep the reports. Reviewers ask for both.
  5. Check your BAAs. Confirm each subcontractor that handles PHI has a BAA with the elements 45 CFR 164.504(e) and 164.314(a) require, and note any shorter notification deadlines your customers' BAAs impose on you.
  6. Track the rulemaking. If HHS publishes a final rule, compare it with the proposal before you plan against it. Final rules often change.

How Shieldra helps

Shieldra organizes this work for health-tech teams. Every plan includes a HIPAA roadmap and readiness score, policy templates, workforce training with completion tracking, an evidence vault and a trust center you can send to reviewers. Premium adds the Security Rule risk analysis with Security Officer sign-off, vendor and BAA tracking with expiry dates, incident and breach tracking, and SOC 2 in the same workspace. Shieldra does not certify HIPAA compliance; no one can, because there is no official HIPAA certification.


Sources: Federal Register, "HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information," 90 FR 898 (January 6, 2025); 45 CFR Part 164, Subparts C and D; 45 CFR 102.3 as amended at 91 FR 3666 (January 28, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.